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PROCESS PATENTS INVOLVING PRINCIPLES
OF NATURE
While every process invention, and indeed every invention of a
machine or of a product, implies certain physical or chemical
properties of matter, there are some process claims from out of
which the underlying natural principle projects like a granite
ledge outcropping through a scanty soil. To those who are about
to align themselves in assault upon or in defense of such a patent,
the outcome of the litigation seems more than usually difficult to
forecast. The text-books give inadequate clues to the guiding
legal principles. And this confusion exists notwithstanding that
the opinions in the two greatest patent cases in our judicial his-
tory, relative to the inventions of Morse and of Bell, construed
with great care, claims of this character; and that the doctrines
there enunciated were in accord with former adjudications and
have ever since been consistently applied.
Before embarking upon the general discussion, it is well to re-
call precisely what is meant by a process, under our statutes, as
defined by the authorities. "A process is a mode of treatment of
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act. or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be trans-
formed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and
useful, it is just as patentable as a piece of machinery. In the
language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed
out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new
or patentable; whilst the process may be altogether new, and
produce an entirely new result. The process requires that cer-
tain things should be done with certain substances, and in a
certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of
secondary consequence."' A new process is usually the re-
sult of discovery; a machine, of invention. The arts of tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber,
melting ores, and numerous others, are usually carried on by
processes, as distinguished from machines. One may discover a
new and useful improvement in the process of tanning, dyeing,
'Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S., 780, 788.
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etc., irrespective of any particular form of machinery or me-
chanical device." 2 In theory a process may be entirely manual.8
On the other hand, "a valid patent cannot be obtained for a pro-
cess which involves nothing more than the operation of a piece
of mechanism, that is to say, for the function of a machine." '
But "a process or method of a mechanical nature, not absolutely
dependent upon a machine, although perhaps best illustrated by
mechanism, may, if new and useful, be the proper subject of a
patent, even though it involves no chemical or other elemental
action." 5
Coming now to the main proposition, it is believed that where
the utility of a process, claimed as new, distinctively depends on
the natural characteristics of materials or substances used in the
process, there are three classes of circumstances where there can
be a valid process patent.
First Class: Where in conjunction with a discovery that some
principle of nature is available for a certain purpose, apparatus
is devised for utilizing the principle. The inventor can describe
his process and the apparatus, whereby it can be performed, and
then claim the process.
"All machines may be regarded as merely devices, by the in-
strumentality of which the laws of nature are made applicable
and operative to the production of a particular result. He who
first discovers that a law of nature can be so applied, and having
devised machinery to make it operative, introduces it in a prac-
tical form to the knowledge of his fellow men, is a discoverer and
inventor of the highest grade, not merely of the mechanism-
the combination of iron, brass, and wood, in the form of levers,
screws or pulleys-but the force which operates through the
mechanical medium-the principle, or, to use the synonym given
for this term in the Act of 1793, the character of the machine.
And this title as a discoverer he may lawfully assert, and secure
to himself by letters patent, thus establishing property, not only
in the formal device for which mechanical ingenuity can at once,
as soon as the principle is known, imagine a thousand substitutes,
2 Corning v. Burden, I5 How., 252, 267, 268.
3 Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., I85 U. S., 425.
4 Risdon Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S., 68; In re Cunning-
ham, 21 App., D. C. 29.
5 In re Weston, 17 App., D. C. 431; Westinghouse v. Boyden Power
Brake Co., 170 U. S., 537, 557.
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some as good, others better, perhaps all dissimilar, yet all illus-
trative of the same principle, and depending on it-but in the
essential principle which his machine was the first to embody, to
exemplify, to make operative and to announce to mankind." 6
In Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How., 156, 175 (1852), Mr. Justice
McLean, speaking for the majority of the court, after stating that
a newly discovered principle applied to useful purposes is patent-
able, said: "In all such cases, the processes used to extract,
modify, and concentrate the natural agencies, constitute the in-
vention. The elements of the power exist; the invention is not
in discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects.
Whether the machinery used be novel, or consist of a new com-
bination of parts shown, the right of the inventor is secured
against all who use the same mechanical power, or one that shall
be substantially the same. * * * A new property discovered in
matter, when practically applied, in the construction of a useful
article of commerce or manufacture, is patentable; but the pro-
cess through which the new property is developed and applied,
must be stated, with such precision as to enable an ordinary
mechanic to construct and apply the necessary process."
Referring to Neilson's patent litigated in the English case of
Neilson v. Thompson, Chief Justice Taney said: "It seems that
the court at first doubted whether it was a patent for anything
more than the discovery that hot air would promote the ignition
of fuel better than cold, and if this had been the construction, the
court, it appears would have held his patent to be void; because
the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical
science is not patentable. But after much consideration, it was
finally decided that this principle must be regarded as well known,
and that the plaintiff had invented a mechanical means of apply-
ing it to furnaces; and that his invention consisted in interposing
a heated receptacle between the blower and the furnace, and by
this means heating the air after it left the blower, and before it
was thrown into the fire." 7
"Now, percussion, reaction, and centrifugal force are, in the
abstract, neither new principles nor subjects of a patent. But
6 judge Kane charging the jury in Parker v. Hulme, Fed. Cas. 1O,74o;
i Fish., Pat. Cas. 44 (C. C. 1849). See also Foote v. Silsby, Fed. Cas.
4,916; i Blatchf, 445 (C. C. 1849).
7 O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How., 62,116 (1853). As to the Neilson patent,
also see Tilghman v. Proctor, l02 U. S., 707, 724 (188o) ; and Risdon Loco-
motive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S., 72, 73, 74 (1894).
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their embodiment and application to machinery may be both new
and useful, and entitle the discoverer to the exclusive use of his
invention. * * * And here lies the secret of this 'Parker
Wheel.' It is the vortical motion of the water on the wheel, which
operates as a coefficient to the reactive power of the water on the
buckets. It is what the patentees claim it to be, to wit: 'An im-
provement in the application of hydraulic power, by a method of
combining percussion with reaction.' 8
In the Telephone Cases, 126 U. S., i (1888), as summarized in
the syllabus, it appeared from proof that "Bell was the first dis-
coverer of the art or process of transferring to, or impressing
upon, a continuous current of electricity in a closed circuit, by
gradually changing its intensity, the vibrations of air produced by
the human voice in articulate speech, in a way to cause the speech
to be carried to and received by a listener at a distance on the line
of the current ;" that he had described in the specification "his in-
vention with sufficient clearness and precision to enable those
skilled in the matter to understand what his process" was and had
pointed out a "practicable way of putting it into operation ;" that
the fifth claim under his patent, No. 174,465, was "not confined to
the magneto instrument, or to such modes of creating electrical
undulations as could be produced by that form of apparatus ;" and
that this claim "also covered his invention of an apparatus to make
useful his discovery of an art or process for electrical transmis-
sion of speech." This claim, on page 13 reads: "5. The method
of, and apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other sounds
telegraphically, as herein described, by causing electrical
undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air
accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, substantially as set
forth." In the opinion of the court by Chief Justice Waite, at
pages 532 and 533, he said: "Bell discovered that it [the re-
producing of speech] would be done by gradually changing the
intensity of a continuous electric current, so as to make it cor-
respond exactly to the changes in the density of the air caused by
the sound of the voice. This was his art. He then devised a way
in which these changes of intensity could be made and speech
actually transmitted. Thus his art was put in a condition for prac-
tical use. In doing this, both discovery and invention, in the popu-
lar sense of those terms, were involved-discovery in finding the
8 Judge Willson charging the jury in Wintermute v. Redington, Fed.
Cas. x7,896; i Fish. Pat. Cas. 239 (C. C. 1856).
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art, and invention in devising the means of making it useful. For
such discoveries and inventions the law has given the discoverer
and inventor the right to a patent-as discoverer, for the useful
art, process, method of doing a thing he has found; and as in-
ventor, for the means he has devised to make his discovery one
of actual value. * * * The patent for the art does not neces-
sarily involve a patent for the particular means employed for
using it. Indeed, the mention of any means, in the specification
or descriptive portion of the patent, is only necessary to show that
the art can be used."
Second Class: Where in a manufacturing process a substance,
having certain physical or chemical properties, is utilized in mak-
ing a product of a certain kind, and where it is discovered that, in
substitution for that substance, a new substance, having certain
physical or chemical properties, can be used in conjunction with
the other instrumentalities of the process to make a new product,
differing from the old product, not in quality or quantity merely,
but in kind; the use of such new substance in conjunction with the
remaining instrumentalities of the old process, if the idea of sub-
stitution is not obvious, constitutes a new and patentable process.
In the well-known case of Crane v. Price, in which the English
Court of Common Pleas upheld a patent for using anthracite in-
stead of bituminous coal, with the hot blast in melting iron ore,
the evidence, as Chief Justice Tindal remarked, proved beyond
doubt that, in the result of the combination of the hot blast with
anthracite, not only was the yield of the furnace more, and the
expense of making the iron less, but the nature, properties and
quality of the iron were better than under the former process by
means of the combination of the hot air blast with bituminous
coal.9 And the decision rests, as was pointed out by Chief Baron
Pollock and Baron Parke in Dobbs v. Penn, 3 Exch., 427, 432, 433,
and by Mr. Justice Bradley in Hicks v. Kelsey, 18 Wall., 67o,
above cited, upon the ground that a new metal or composition of
matter was produced. * * * So in Smith v. Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co.,10 in this court, as was observed by Mr. Justice
Story, in delivering its judgment: "A new product was the re-
sult, differing from all that had preceded it, not merely in degree
94 Man. & Gr. 58o, 6o4; 5 Scott N. R. 338,389; 1 Webster Pat. Cas.
393,410.
1093 U. S. 486, 494. See also Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v.
Davis, zo2 U. S., 222.
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of usefulness and excellence, but differing in kind, having new
uses and properities." 11
In Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Frederick Crane Chemical Co., 36 Fed,
110, 112 (C. C. i888), in an opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, on
demurrer to the bill, the court says: "The principal improvement
consists in the employment of certain substances as solvents or
converting agents of pyroxyline or nitro-cellulose, in manufactur-
ing compounds of that substance. The principal solvent hereto-
fore used has been camphor, or a solution of camphor in alcohol.
* * * 'It was the object of my experiments to find new
menstrua which are in themselves such active solvents of pyroxy-
line as to render the use of camphor unnecessary, and I have suc-
ceeded to the extent hereinafter set forth. My new group of
active liquid solvents or converting agents, comprises oil of spear-
mint, nitrate of methyl, butyric acid, valeric ether, benzoic ether,'
etc. (naming twenty-two different substances.) The specifica-
tion then proceeds to give directions as to the quantity of these in-
gredients to be used, and the manner of using them, stating that
they may be used in connection with each other, or with camphor
or alcohol, or singly by themselves. * * * It is true that the
mere discovery of the qualities possessed by these substances is
not patentable; in other words, the qualities themselves cannot be
patented. But the patent in question is not granted for the dis-
covery, nor for the solvent quality of the substances; it is granted
for the 'use' of the substances 'in the art of manufacturing com-
pounds of pyroxyline, substantially as described,' that is, as de-
scribed and pointed out in the specification. * * * And it
would seem that the result of the process is a different substance
from that produced when camphor is the solvent used. The speci-
fication, it is true, intimates and concedes that certain parts of the
process were well known; but exactly what was well known, and
what was not, does not appear. No former patents are exhibited
in the bill. Perhaps, by the answer of the defendants and proofs
taken in the case, it may be made to appear that every part of the
process, as a process, was known and used before, and that the
only originality on the part of the patentee was the discovery of
the fact that oil of spearmint and the other substances named are
solvents of pyroxyline. Should this be so, the question would
31Mr. Justice Gray in Penn. R. R. v. Locomotive Truck Co., 110
U. S., 490, 494, 495.
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then be fairly presented whether the mere discovery of this fact
was patentable."
In these decisions, there is also pointed out the close analogy
existing between a patent for a process, using a new substance in
a combination to make a new product, and a patent for a new
composition of matter. As there is a tendency to limit, though not
to deny, patentability in respect to such new compositions, it is
reasonable to believe a like tendency exists as regards such pro-
cesses. There are many recent decisions, holding certain com-
binations of materials, with a substitution of one new material
therein, to be unpatentable.12
Third Class: Where it is discovered that the result of an old
process can be improved by the introduction or substitution of
some substance, having certain physical or chemical properties,
and by its utilization IN A NOVEL MANNER in conjunction with the
other instrumentalities of the old process, SUCH NEW USE, if the
idea is not obvious, also constitutes a new and patentable process.
In McClurg v. Kingsland, I How., 202 (843), it appeared that
some method had long been sought by which rollers or cylinders
could be so cast that the metal, when introduced into the mould
be given a rotary motion, so as to throw the flog or dross into the
center instead of the circumference of the casting. "By the old
mode, the metal was conveyed from the furnace to the mould
through a gate, or pipe, placed in a horizontal or perpendicular
direction." Harley discovered a new method, which he explained
in his specification as follows: "The tube or tubes, or passages
called gates, through which the metal to be conveyed into the
moulds shall not enter the mould perpendicularly at the bottom,
but slanting, or in a direction approaching to a tangent of the
cylinder, or if the gates enter the moulds horizontally or nearly
so, shall not enter in the direction of the axis of the cylinder, but
in a tangent from, or inclining towards a tangent of the cylinder."
A claim covering this process of manufacture was upheld.13
In Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall., 620 (1871), the patent was
for an improved method of casting car wheels, consisting: First,
12.Ex parte Grayson & Crecelius, C. D. i894, ioo; American Acetylene
Burner Co. v. Kirchberger, 142 Fed., 745 (C. C. A. 1905) ; Hogan v. West-
moreland Specialty Co., z45 Fed., igg (C. C. i9o6); Edison Electric Light
Co. v. Novelty Incandescent Light Co., i6I Fed., 549 (C. C. iqo8).
'ITo the same effect are Detmold v. Reeves, Fed. Gas. 3,831; 1 Fish.
Pat. (as. 127 (C. C. i85x); and Bell v. Daniels, Fed. Cas. I, 247; 1 Fish.
Pat. Cas. 372 (C. C. 1858).
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of taking the wheels from the moulds when partially cooled and
before any straining of the parts could occur; second, of the
placing them in a chamber of about the same temperature; third,
of then reheating them almost to the point of fusion, and fourth,
of then cooling them just fast enough for all parts to cool and
shrink simultaneously. Said Mr. Justice Strong, at pages 642
and 643: "We have sought in vain through the proofs sub-
mitted in this case for any satisfactory evidence that this pro-
cess was known before 1847, when Whitney commenced it, or
that anything equivalent to that process was known. Certainly
nothing of the kind had ever been applied to cast-iron railroad
wheels, and, as we have seen, they are castings of a peculiar
character, not admitting of the treatment that may be applied to
other castings. What they needed was (what was substantially
described by-one of the witnesses), the discovery of the" fact that
the chilled cast-iron, constituting one part of the wheel, could be
subjected to heat less than that which would cause fusion, with-
out producing any material effect upon its hardness, while the
cooling of other parts of the wheel could be so prolonged by
applying heat externally, as to enable all parts to cool without
being subjected to the strain attendant on unequal contraction,
and in addition to the discovery, they needed the invention of a
process by which it could be practically carried out. Such a dis-
covery and such a process were needed for no other castings.
* * * The specification disclaims invention of annealing iron
castings done in the ordinary mode. It claims annealing when
applied to cast-iron railroad wheels, in the mode or by the pro-
cess described. It is nct, therefore, merely an old contrivance or,
process applied to a new object, a case of double use. A new and
previously unknown result is obtained, namely, the relief of the
plate of the wheels from inherent strains without impairing the
chilled tread, a result which, though anxiously sought, had not
been obtained before Whitney's invention." 1'
In Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S., 78o, 786 (1876), Mr. Justice
Bradley, in reference to an improved process for making flour,
after quoting from the specification said: "His improvement,
therefore, does not consist in using drafts or currents of air, but
14 See also the Circuit Court cases of Roberts v. Dickey, Fed. Cas.
11,899; 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 532 (1871); Roberts v. Schreiber, 2 Fed. 8 5
(88o); Cary v. Wolff, 24 Fed. 139 (1885); Cary v. Lovell Mfg. Co., 31
Fed. 344 (1887).
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in the process as a whole, comprising the application of the blast,
and the carrying off of the fine impurities, whereby the mid-
dlings are purified preparatory to re-grinding after being
separated from the other parts."
In Andrews v. Carman, Fed. Cas. 37 1; 13 Blatchf., 307 (C. C.
1876), the claim was for "the process of constructing wells by
driving or forcing an instrument into the ground until it is pro-
jected into the water, without removing the earth upwards, as it
is in boring, substantially as herein described." Said Judge
Benedict: "This process involves a new idea, which was put into
practical use when the method was devised of fitting tightly in
the earth, by the art of driving without removing the earth up-
wards, a tube open at both ends but otherwise air-tight, and ex-
tending down to a water-bearing stratum, to which is attached a
pump, a vacuum in the well pit, and at the same time in the water-
bearing stratum of the earth, being necessarily created by the
operation of a pump attached to a pipe so driven. * * * Such
an invention is without the field of mechanical contrivance. It
consists in the new application of a power of nature, by which
new application a new and useful result is attained. There is no
new product, but an old product-water-is obtained from the
earth in a new and advantageous manner. * * * The elements
of the process may be old, but, when combined for the purpose
of putting to practical use the new idea of forcing water in this
way from the earth into a well pit, -they constitute a new and
useful process." The patentability of this invention was upheld
for like reasons in various Circuit Court decisions cited in Eames
v. Andrews, 122 U. S., 47; but the patent was ultimately held
invalid on account of two years' public use before the filing of
the application.
In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707 (i88o), reversing Mit-
chell v. Tilghman, i Wall. 287 (873), the specification stated:
"My invention consists of a process for producing free fat acids
and solution from those fatty and oily bodies of animal and vege-
table origin which contain glycerine as their base. For this pur-
pose, I subject these fatty or oily bodies to the action of water at
a high temperature and pressure, so as to cause the elements of
those bodies to combine with water, and thereby obtain at the
same time free fat acids and solution of glycerine. I mix the
fatty body to be operated upon with from a third to a half of its
bulk of water, and the mixture may be placed in any convenient
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vessel in which it can be heated to the melting-point of lead, until
the operation is complete. The vessel must be closed and of great
strength, so that the requisite amount of pressure may be ap-
plied to prevent the conversion of the water into steam ;" and then
described an apparatus suitable for use in applying the process.
The claim read: "Having now described the nature of my said
invention, and the manner of performing the same, I hereby de-
clare that I claim, as of my invention, the manufacturing of fat
acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at
a high temperature and pressure." It appeared that before the
invention of Tilghman, the patentee, there had been two other
processes for effecting a decomposition of fats into their com-
ponent elements, but that each process "was often accompanied
by prejudicial effects from the access of atmospheric air to the
contents of the still." In view of Tilghman's improved process,
as further amplified by the proof, Mr. Justice Bradley, at pages
721 and 722, said: "He discovered that fat can be dissolved into
its constituent elements by the use of water alone under a high
degree of heat and pressure; and he patented the process of
'manufacturing fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the
action of water at a high temperature and pressure.' Had the
process been known and used before, and not been Tilghman's
invention, he could not have claimed anything more than the
particular apparatus described in his patent; but being the in-
ventor of the process, as we are satisfied was the fact, he was en-
titled to claim it in the manner he did." The patentee, therefote,
applied to the fatty bodies: (i) water only; (2) in a closed
vessel; (3) at a high temperature and pressure.' 5
In Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U. S., 413 (1887), the third
claim, on page 423, was: "The process of preparing and preserv-
ing beer for the market, which consists in holding it under con-
trollable pressure of carbonic acid gas from the beginning of the
kraeusen stage until such time as it is transferred to kegs and
bunge substantially as described." In the opinion, at pages 427
and 428, Mr. Justice Blatchford said: "We think that the
method or art covered by the third claim of the patent is patent-
able as a process, irrespective of the apparatus or instrumentality
for carrying it out. It is the performing of a series of acts upon
the beer in the kraeusen stage, producing new and useful re-
sults in the art of making marketable beer. The process consists
15 See also Hammersclag v. Scamoni, 7 Fed., 584 (C. C. I881).
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not in merely applying an apparatus to the cask at some period of
the kraeusen stage of the beer, but consists in this, that when the
beer has been put into the casks, and the kraeusen beer is added
to it, and the apparatus is applied at the beginning of the
kraeusen stage, the beer will be kept under the control of
carbonic acid gas until such time as it is fit to be transferred to
the kegs for market, such pressure resulting in the complete and
speedy clarification of the beer, although it is in a state of active
fermentation in the closed shaving casks, with the incidental re-
sults of no loss of beer, and no fouling of the casks or cellar, and
no danger to the health of the workmen. * * * There appears
also to be a new principle of action involved in the invention of
the patentees. The carbonic acid gas generated by the fermenta-
tion in the cask, instead of being allowed to continually ascend,
as it does with an open bung-hole, keeping the liquid constantly
in a turbid state and overflowing at the bung-hole, is made, as
stated in the specification, to first accumulate in the space above
the beer in the closed cask, until the pressure is such that the gas
overcomes the density of the beer, and enters it again, and
charges it up to the pressure at which the water column is set,
thus creating an equilibrium between the rising bubbles of gas
and the pressure above, so that gravity can act on the yeast and
impurities, and carry them down so that they will remain with
the shavings at the bottom. This is a new use, in the treatment
of fermenting beer, of the carbonic acid gas which it generates,
and a new method or process of hastening the clarifying and
settling of the beer."
In Carnegie Steel Co. v. C'mbria Iron Co., 185 U. S., 403
(19O2), the process, as summarized in the syllabus, "consisted
[in the placing] of a large reservoir between the blast furnace
and the converters, in which should always be maintained a large
quantity of metal, which should be drawn off in small quantities
at a time and replenished by a like quantity of metal from the
blast furnaces." The claims, on page 4o9, were: "i. In the
art of refining iron directly from smelting furnaces, the process
of equalizing the chemical composition of the crude metal by
thoroughly commingling or mixing together the liquid metal
charge and subsequently refining the mixed and equalized charge,
substantially as and for the purposes described. 2. In the art of
mixing molten metal to secure uniformity of the same in its con-
stituent parts preparatory to further treatment, the process of in-
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troducing into a mixing receptacle successive portions of molten
metal ununiform in their non-metallic constituents (sulphur,
silicon, etc.), removing portions only of the composite molten
contents of the receptacle without entirely draining or emptying
the same, and successively replenishing the receptacle with fresh
ununiform additions,, substantially as and for the purposes de-
scribed." On pages 413-417 are stated the disadvantages of the
old Bessemer process for making steel and how the process of
Jones, the patentee, was a most decided improvement on the for-
mer process. "To enable the Jones process to be successfully
carried out it is necessary (i) that the intermediate reservoir or
mixer should be of large size, 'say ioo tons' capacity; (2) that it
be covered to prevent the access of cold air from without; (3)
that it be provided with a stop, so that it may not be tilted so far
as to be emptied of its contents; (4) that a quantity of molten
metal so large as to absorb all the variations of the product of
the blast furnace received into it and thus to unify the metals
discharged into the converters, be constantly retained in it." (At
page 425.) Said Mr. Justice Brown, at page 429, delivering the
opinion of the court upholding the patent: "It is true the Jones
patent is a simple one, and in the light of present experience it
seems strange that none of the expert steel makers, who approach
so near the consummation of their desires, should have failed to
take the final step which was needed to convert their experi-
ments into an assured success." 16
These three classes of cases mark the limits of restrictive
ownership in processes-like three headlands they put out into
the free seas of the principles of nature, where every man can
sail his craft" according to his own pleasure. In the previous de-
cisions, the line of demarcation has been viewed from the land-
ward side, as it were; its aspect will now be considered from the
vision point of free privileges for all. Possibly a fairly accurate
generalization of the authorities, finally to be collated, is this:
Using machinery or apparatus, previously employed in a given
process, one cannot patentably introduce in the process, in place
of an old material or substance, having at a given step in the
process a certain physical or chemical effect in producing the
result of the process, some new material or substance, the effect
of which is simply to improve the result in quality or quantity.
16 See also United States Mitis Co. v. Midvale Steel Co., 135 Fed., o3
(C. C. x9o4).
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In Wyeth v. Stone, Fed. Cas. 18,1o7; i Story, 273 (C. C.
184o), the claim stated: "It is claimed as new, to cut ice of a
uniform size, by means of an apparatus worked by any other
power than human. The invention of this art, as well as of the
particular method of the application of the principle, is claimed
by the subscriber." Said Mr. Justice Story: "It is plain, then,
that here the patentee claims an exclusive title to the art of
cutting ice by means of any power, other than human power.
Such a claim is utterly unmaintainable in point of law. It is
a claim for an art or principle in the abstract, and not for any
particular method or machinery, by which ice is to be cut. No
man can have a right to cut ice by all means or methods, or by
all or any sort of apparatus, although he is not the inventor of
any or all such means, methods, or apparatus." 17
In the opinion in Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How., 156, 175 (1852),
already quoted, Mr. Justice McLean also said: "Nor can an
exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in
addition to those already known. Through the agency of ma-
chinery a new steam power may be said to have been generated.
But no one can appropriate this power to himself, under the
patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, and of any
other power in nature, which is alike open to all, and may be
applied to useful purposes by the aid of machinery. A patent is
not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that
would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing
by any means whatsoever. This, by creating monopolies, would
discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of
the patent laws."
In O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How., 62 (1853), one question was
as to the validity of the eighth claim in the Morse patent of 1848,
covering his invention of the electric telegraph. From the
specification, given on pages 83-95, it appears that Morse fully
described his discovery and also apparatus for its practical appli-
cation. Then le claimed: "Eighth. I do not propose to limit
myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery, described
in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of my in-
vention being the use of the motive power of the electric or gal-
27 Also see Smith v. Ely, Fed. Cas. I3,o43; 5 McLean, 76 (C. C. 1849).
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vanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed,
for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at
any distance, being a new application of that power, of which
I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer." Said Chief Jus-
tice Taney, at pages 112-120: "It is impossible to misunder-
stand the extent of this claim. He claims the exclusive right
to every improvement where the motive power is the electric or
galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelli-
gible characters, signs, or letters at a distance. If this claim can
be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the
result is accomplished. For aught that we know some future in-
ventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or gal-
vanic current, without using any part of the process or com-
bination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. * * * Nor is
this all, while he shuts the door against inventions of other per-
sons, the patentee would be able to avail himself of new dis-
coveries in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism
which scientific men might bring to light. For he says he does
not confine his claim to the machinery or parts of machinery,
which he specifies; but claims for himself a monopoly of its
use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance.
* * * The court is of the opinion that the claim is too broad,
and not warranted by law. No one, we suppose, will maintain
that Fulton could have taken out a patent for his invention of pro-
pelling vessels by steam, describing the process and machinery
he used, and claiming under it the exclusive right to use the
motive power of steam, however developed, for the purpose of
propelling vessels. * * * Neither could the man who first
discovered that steam might, by a proper arrangement of ma-
chinery, be used as a motive power to grind corn or spin cotton,
claim the right to the exclusive use of steam as a motive power
for the purpose of producing such effects. Again, the use of
steam power in printing presses is comparatively a modem dis-
covery. Was the first inventor of a machine or process of this
kind entitled to a patent, giving him the exclusive right to use
steam as a motive power, however developed, for the purpose of
marking or printing intelligible characters? * * * The speci-
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fication of this patentee describes his invention or discovery, and
the manner and process of constructing and using it; and his
patent, like inventions in the other arts above mentioned, covers
nothing more. * * * Indeed, if the eighth claim of the pa-
tentee can be maintained, there was no necessity for any specifi-
cation, further than to say that he had discovered that, by using
the motive power of electro-magnetism, he could print intelligible
characters at any distance. We presume it will-be admitted on
all hands, that no patent could have issued on such a specification.
Yet this claim can derive no aid from the specification filed. It
is outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it."
A comparison between the Telephone Cases and O'Reilly v.
Morse is highly instructive. In each specification the discovery
of a new principle and details of apparatus for its application
were described. Here the resemblance ceases. Bell made the
claim for his telephonic process dependent, even in terms, upon
his specification. Perhaps he was unnecessarily particular. For
it is well settled that a claim is to be interpreted in the light of the
specification even without the incorporation of the words "sub-
stantially as described," or the like. On the other hand, Morse,
after having built, by his specification, the foundation for a
strong process claim, deliberately destroyed, as it were, that
foundation by claiming the use of the electric current for mak-
ing or printing intelligible characters, letters or signs at any
distance in entire independence of all apparatus. The scope of
this article does not include a discussion as to what constitutes
the infringement of a- valid process claim. Suffice it to say that
many authorities, some of which have been here cited, establish
the proposition that a properly expressed process claim is in-
fringed by the use of the process, even though the apparatus em-
ployed is different. But a process is a method for accomplishing
a result. And there can be no infringement in accomplishing
the same result by some other method. Hence a process claim
cannot be for the result or function of the process. The diffi-
culty with the Morse claim was its functional character. If that
claim had been allowable, it might have been possible to quite
monopolize the transmission and receipt of intelligible signs at a
distance. Such a claim would have dominated the art of wire-
less telegraphy. Indeed, it almost seems, in reading some parts
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of his great opinion, as if Chief Justice Taney, with prophetic
vision, had foreseen the invention of Marconi.
In Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, Fed. Cas. 9, 865, 5
Blatchf., i6 (C. C. 1862), the patentees had discovered that'
the inhalation of ether, a well known compound, produced in-
sensibility to pain and had secured a patent for the process of
administering ether in conjunction with the performance of
surgical operations, the apparatus used for administering the
ether being fully described in the specification, but being admit-
tedly old. In adjudging the claim void, Judge Shipman said:
."It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere domain
of discovery, and has laid hold of the new principle, force, or
law, and connected it with some particular medium or mechanical
contrivance by which, or through which, it acts on the material
world, that he can secure the exclusive control of it under the
patent laws. He then controls his discovery through the means
by which he has brought it into practical action, or their equiva-
lent, and only through them. It is then an invention, although
it embraces a discovery. Sever the force or principle discovered
from the means or mechanism through which he has brought it
into the domain of invention, and it immediately falls out of that
domain and eludes his grasp. It is then a naked discovery, and
not an invention." Then, with reference to the facts presented,
he continued: "The effect discovered was produced by old
agents, operating by old means upon old subjects. The effect
alone was new, and to that only can the term 'discovery' apply.
That this mere discovery, however novel and important, is not
patentable, needs neither argument nor authority to prove. At
this point the patent breaks down; for the specification presents
nothing new except the effect produced by well known agents,
administered in well known ways on well known subjects. This
new or additional effect is not produced by any new instrument
by which the agent is administered, nor by any different applica-
tion of it to the body of the patient. * * * It is nothing more,
in the eye of the law, than the application of a well known agent,
by well known means, to a new or more perfect use, which is not
sufficient to support a patent."
In Shaw & Wilcox Co. v: Lovejoy, Fed. Cas. 12,727; 7
Blatchf., 232 (C. C. i87o), it was held that the new use of
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chemicals in an old apparatus for recovering precious metals
from waste metallic solutions was not patentable. After stating
the facts in detail, Judge Blatchford said: "The specification
states, that the vessel may be of any suitable material and of
any suitable form or size; that in it may be suspended a bag
containing any ingredient that will precipitate the metal, or such
ingredient may be placed in the vessel in a loose state; that, after
the precipitation takes place, the liquid may be drawn off through
a suitable pipe arranged in a suitable part of the vessel, or it may
be allowed to fill the vessel and run away over the top; that a
filtering device may be used with the pipe, but can be dispensed
with for the majority of solutions; and that the vessel may have
a partition in it or not. The sum and substance of all this is,
that the result is the thing claimed to be patented. The
apparatus is nothing but a vessel to hold the liquid, and the pro-
cess consists only in putting into the liquid in the vessel the
proper chemicals to effect the precipitation of the valuable metal.
That a suitable vessel of a suitable form and size must be used
to contain the liquid, if the liquid is to be utilized is no new idea.
To discover that a suitable precipitating ingredient will preci-
pitate what it is capable of precipitating, is no invention. The
claim is altogether vague and general. It is open to the objection
stated in the case of O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How., 62, 119, against
the eighth claim of Morse's telegraph patent. It is, in effect, a
claim to the use of the proper chemicals to precipitate the metal
from the liquid waste solution, by putting such chemicals into any
proper vessel containing the solution." 18
In some of the early cases, questions that have been here con-
sidered were presented in charges to the jury in actions at law
for damages. Generally they have been presented at a full hear-
ing upon the evidence in suits in equity. Sometimes the in-
validity of a process claim has been so apparent that it has been
determined on a demurrer to the bill. But this latter procedure,
desirable as it is for securing a speedy adjudication, is only
available in clear cases. In Chinock v. Paterson, P. & S. Tel. Co.,
112 Fed. Cas., 531 (C. C. A. 19o2), a decision on demurrer by the
1s See also Wall v. Leck, 66 Fed., 552, (C. C. A. I895) ; American Straw-
board Co. z. Elkhart Egg Case Co., 84 Fed., 96o (C. C. 1898); Daylight
Glass Mfg. Co. v. American Prismatic Light Co., 142 Fed. 454 (C. C. A.
i9o5); Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 15x Fed.,
22(C. C. 197).
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Circuit Court, holding a process claim invalid, was reversed on
the ground that the alleged invalidity was not so apparent as to
permit of its being thus determined. As to the availability of
such demurrers, reference may be had to the valuable article in
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. V, page 213 (1895), entitled:
Determining the Validity of a Patent on Demurrer to a Bill in
Equity, by Mr. Samuel H. Fisher; and also to the note to Cald-
well v. Powell, i9 C. C. A., 595 (1896).
George P. Carroll.
Bridgeport, Conn.
